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We consider Baars’ "Global Workspace" theory of
consciousness and discuss its possible representation
within a model of intelligent agents. We first review a
particular agent implementation that is given by an
abstract machine, and then identify the extensions that
are required in order to accommodate the main aspects of
consciousness. According to Baars’ theory, this amounts
to unconscious process coalitions that result in the
creation of contexts. These extensions can be formulated
within a reified virtual machine encompassing a
representation of the original machine as well as an
additional introspective component. This computational
framework is illustrating throughout using a simple
working example.
1 INTRODUCTION
The study of consciousness can follow quite a few
different paths. At one end of the spectrum lies the so-
called "search for the neural correlates of consciousness"
[2]. Briefly, this approach involves "isolating the neural
processes that correlate with various states of
consciousness". Following the increased availability of
brain imaging techniques, the experimental research
conducted under this banner is burgeoning. At the other
end of the spectrum, we find theories that are formulated
merely in terms of information processing presumably
conducted by the brain [7]. This line of research has often
been described as constituting a complementary "search
for the computational correlates of consciousness". This
second approach however has yet to mature to the point
of producing concrete definitions leading to experimental
platforms. The aim of our own research is to contribute to
such an effort. Towards this end, we decided first to
delineate a functional aspect of consciousness that could
easily be amenable to a computational process. To allow
then for practical experiments that could be replicated by
others, we decided to situate our developments within a
model of intelligent agents enjoying both formal and
executable specifications. We are thus able to present a
generic computational framework for implementing
Baars’ Global Workspace theory of consciousness [3].
More precisely, we reproduce in concrete terms the rather
abstract notions of unconscious processor coalitions and
the subsequent creation of unconscious contexts that lie
at the heart of this theory.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in
section 2, we briefly review existing models of
consciousness, and explain why we did retain Baars’
theory; in section 3 we introduce Baars’ global
workspace model; in section 4, we identify its various
computational correlates; in section 5 we introduce a
particular model of a deliberative agent given as a
sequential abstract machine; section 6 presents the
corresponding reified virtual machine given under the
form of concurrent threads with an introspective
extension; finally section 7 allows for the creation of
contexts. We conclude by confronting our resulting
computational framework with Aleksander and
Dunmall’s [1] axioms for consciousness.
2 VARIETIES OF CONSCIOUSNESS
It has become customary to map the functional aspect
of consciousness into four distinct roles i.e., access,
phenomenal, monitoring and self-consciousness [4].
Briefly, access consciousness (A-consciousness) refers
to the human capacity to use language and explicit
planning in order to act towards a specific goal.
Phenomenal consciousness (P-consciousness) allows
one to actually feel (emotional experiences, sensations)
and thus to get qualitative inputs (appropriately named
qualia) that amount to differentiating perceptions.
Monitoring consciousness (M-consciousness) refers to
the state or process of awareness that leads to one’s
sensations and percepts, as opposed to the contents of
those sensations and percepts themselves. Finally, self-
consciousness (S-consciousness) is the reflective
capability we enjoy when we think about ourselves. Few
information processing theories (if any) make a clear
distinction between these different types of
consciousness, and it is still unclear whether or not these
functions can actually be dissociated.
Existing computational models of consciousness can
be further distinguished according to the following
orthogonal properties [2]: process vs. representation
theories, on one hand, and specialized vs. non specialized
ones, on the other. We quote from [2]: "The process vs.
representation dimension opposes models that explain
consciousness in terms of specific processes operating
over mental representations, with models that explain
consciousness in terms of intrinsic properties of mental
representations". The specialized versus non-specialized
distinction simply refers to the existence or non existence
of a dedicated machinery for consciousness. In the
absence of such dedicated machinery, consciousness
could be said to emerge from the "collective activity of
many components distributed both spatially and
functionally across the brain, none of them responsible
for consciousness on its own". 
Clearly, any candidate theory for an effective
computational simulation should qualify as a specialized
process model. Furthermore, if we take into account the
results of decades of research done in the field of
Artificial Intelligence, A-consciousness appears to be the
function most likely to be ever replicated on a computer.
Among all existing A-consciousness specialized process
models, Baars’ global workspace theory [3] is
undoubtedly the most elaborate one, and thus became our
natural choice.
As a prerequisite towards reproducing A-
consciousness, we need an effective model of
coordinated action and planning. Then only ultimately,
when this gets implemented as an abstract machine,
models of embodied cognition (such as A-consciousness)
will possibly emerge from complex systems that are built
upon them. Our recent proposal, that integrates formal
communication primitives within a multi-agent system
with plans [5] and defines a language for agent dialogues
[6], is an example of a basic abstract machine that could
be used for that purpose. We may add that S-
consciousness, and perhaps also forms of P- and M-
consciousness could only emerge from complex systems
that are interpreted by a declarative self-representation of
such an abstract machine (we are presently working
towards that goal). 
3 THE GLOBAL WORKSPACE MODEL
In this model, consciousness is seen as a place where
unconscious elements interact with the system in order to
access the global workspace. 
Figure 1 offers a view of the essential components of
the model. The unconscious specialized processors
represent the basic components in an entity. They are
autonomous and work in parallel with other processors.
Some processors may have to achieve a more complex
task and thus do need to collaborate with other
processors. Towards this end, a processor has to access
consciousness. Consciousness is seen as a global
workspace whose role is to broadcast the needs of the
conscious processor. The processors fitting these needs
form a coalition. A coalition can in turn access the global
workspace if it is not able to achieve the required task,
and so on until all the necessary processors are in the
coalition. A same coalition formed several times is fixed
into a context. A context involves then several
unconscious processors pursuing a common goal. A
context is unconscious as it has been learned by the
consciousness while forming coalitions. The model does
not specify how much "several times" means, therefore
we consider in our implementation that once a coalition
was able to achieve a task it is fixed into a context. 
Hence contexts represent the framework of the
system and influence directly the processors behaviour.
For example the perception of the horizon is different
from the hard ground or from a pitching boat. Several
contexts can be active at the same time, they are then
organised in a hierarchy. A context can be disrupted, its
processors must then gain access to the global workspace
to form it again. Moreover if the disrupting context
embeds other contexts, all of them disrupt in series.
These disruptions actually constitute feelings like
surprise. 
4 IDENTIFYING THE COMPUTATIONAL 
CORRELATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS
Observing the global workspace effects leads to
 Figure 1: Baars’ global workspace model
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notice that it has actually at least two functions. First
consciousness gives unconscious processors the
opportunity to form a coalition thus allowing to achieve
a given task. This is related to deliberation. Indeed the
entity embedding consciousness has to think about how
to achieve a given task. Secondly the global workspace
allows to learn repetitive tasks creating automatic
reflexes, called contexts. From a computational point of
view, creating such contexts amounts to compile the
deliberation process. We propose then to distinguish
these two levels of consciousness as they pursue two
different goals in parallel. 
To implement our model, we identify two types of
processors (in the sense of Baars): 
• Processors that depict the environment, providing
either a representation of external elements or a
situation information. They are typically
autonomous and do not require any coalitions as
they represent a fact. 
• Processors that activate an action. The action itself
is not represented, even if an action can be made of
several smaller actions (e.g. moving a step forward
implies a vast number of movements). We assume
that such an action is typically automated, i.e.
represented within a context. Calling an action
amounts then to call a context and action activation
results in action selection. Some actions can be
autonomous and can be self activated without
appealing to consciousness (e.g. breathing, heart
beating). More interesting are the actions that can
be activated only in some situations, depending on
the environment change. Such processors are not
autonomous and need to access consciousness in
order to build a coalition with one or many
processors depicting environment. 
We then define deliberation as the formation of
coalitions leading to activate an action. A process needed
by the action to be activated constitutes a condition for
the action selection. Deliberation is recursive in the sense
that a coalition may need to access the global workspace
to associate new processors to the coalition. 
A context is defined as an unconscious and permanent
processor coalition. A context discharges consciousness
from forming coalitions as they are compiled. Hence it
allows to select directly an action without calling on the
global workspace. 
An example of deliberation is provided in section 5
when introducing plan deduction. An example of context
creation is provided in section 6 after having introduced
multithreading.
5 A SEQUENTIAL ABSTRACT MACHINE 
As already indicated in section 2, our implementation
of the computational correlates we just identified will
rely on an abstract machine. This abstract machine
consists of a set of procedures implementing abstract
functions defining a general model of reactive agent with
sensing [8]. These procedures generate runs for
individual non-deterministic agents with plans.
The agents’ behaviour is defined with plans. A plan is
given under the form of universally quantified
implications "conditions" ⇒ do(p,a) for action selection
or "conditions" ⇒ switch(p,p’) for changing plan where
a is an action and p a plan name. A plan describes a
situation where one can execute an action - if available in
a given plan - or switch plan if the related conditions are
met. 
As an example consider the following plans
description for an agent whose goal is to wander in a grid
and to suck dirt when he finds some. 
true ⇒ switch(initial, start)
dirt(X,Y) ⇒ switch(start, work)
dirt(X,Y) ∧ in(X,Y) ⇒ switch(work, suck(X,Y))
true ⇒ do(suck(X,Y), suck(X,Y))
¬dirt(X,Y) ∧ in(X,Y) ⇒ switch(work, move(X,Y))
true ⇒ do(move(X,Y), move(X,Y))
¬dirt(X,Y) ⇒ switch(start, home)
in(X,Y) ⇒ switch(home, back(X,Y))
true ⇒ do(back(X,Y),back(X,Y))
The switch/2 predicate makes the agent change plan
when the conditions are verified and do/2 predicate
executes an action in a given plan. Note that in this
example the plan and the action do not have to bear the
same name, the only requirements being that the
arguments have to be passed to the action as it depends
on the localisation. 
These plans actually implement the agent’s
deliberation as previously defined. Conditions in the
plans correspond to the processors needed to depict a
precise aspect of the environment in the deliberation
process. Plan names mark the deliberation progress, i.e.
they set a coalition in a certain state. As long as an action
can not be selected, the coalition needs to check a new
condition. Once a coalition is complete, i.e. all the
conditions are met, an action is selected.
Deliberation can be represented by a tree (see
figure 2). The leaves represent the action selection
processors, the italic branches represent the processors
depicting environment and the nodes are the plan names,
i.e. the deliberation progress. 
The abstract machine is defined with the following
procedures: 
procedure react(e,l,p)
if l |− do(p,a)
then e ← τe(e,a)
else if l |− switch(p,p’)
then react(e,l,p’)
procedure sense(l,e)
if "the agent perceives s"
then l ← τa(l,s)
procedure run(e,l)
loop sense(l,e);
if l |− plan(p0)
then react(e,l,p0)
where l is the agent’s local state, e the environment, p a
plan (p0 is the initial plan), a an action. e ← τe(e,a) and
l ← τa(l,s) are transition functions on the environment
when an action a is executed respectively on the local
state when s is perceived. Thus react tries to deduce a
predicate do/2; if it succeeds it executes the action a and
updates the environment otherwise it switches plan.
Procedure sense updates the agents local states when it
perceives a percept s from the environment. Finally the
main procedure run is a loop on the sense and react
procedures. Note that run calls react with an initial plan
that is deduced at each cycle, thus representing the
proactive capability of an agent. 
This abstract machine implements the deliberation
process via sequential procedures. Recalling that
consciousness is made of parallel processors, that several
coalitions can access consciousness and that
consciousness itself is made of two concurrent levels, i.e.
deliberation and context formation, calls for a parallel
abstract machine.
6 A MULTITHREADED VIRTUAL MACHINE
Using a concurrent agent language [6], we can
translate the sequential abstract machine into concurrent
dialogues, each dialogue being executed in separated
thread. These dialogues are compiled into plans executed
on an abstract machine similar to the previous one
(actually extended to support multithreading). Hence this
multithreaded virtual machine encompasses the
sequential abstract machine. The following dialogues
implement the multithreaded virtual machine: 
dialog(run(P0), []
[concurrent(sense),
 concurrent(react(P0))]),
dialog(sense, [S],
[ask(native_sense, S),
 execute(store(S)),
 resume(sense)]),
dialog(react(P), [],
[((do(P,A) | [concurrent(do(P,A))]);
  (switch(P,Q) | [concurrent(switch(P,Q))]))]),
dialog(do(P,A), [],
[execute(A),
 concurrent(react(P0))]),
dialog(switch(P,Q), [], 
[concurrent(react(Q))]).
The behaviour of an agent is described in the same
manner as previously, i.e. the plans presented in the
previous section apply on this machine. Figure 3 offers a
graphical representation of the machine. Note that the
arrows representing interactions with the environment
are doted as they are taken over from the lower abstract
machine (e.g. ask(native_sense, S) in the sense dialogue
 Figure 2: Tree view of our example’s plans
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refers to the sense procedure of the latter). 
This multithreaded virtual machine is made of five
concurrent dialogues but actually of only two parallel
independent (i.e. not synchronized) loops: sensing and
plan/action selection. These loops correspond to the
main elements of deliberation fitting the needs for an
action to be selected on the basis of the environment
depiction. 
At this level, the multithreaded machine behaves
similarly to the sequential machine (see section 5). In
order to initiate consciousness we reflect the agent’s
deliberation to a meta level: the consciousness.
Reflection achieves the agent’s ability to become
conscious of its deliberation steps. Towards this end we
create a new dialogue introspect that starts a new thread
attached (i.e. synchronized) on both basic deliberation
threads: switch and do (see figure 4). 
These threads are given by
dialog(reflect(do), [P,A],
[ask(do(P,A), do(P,A)),
* some handling *,
resume(reflect(do))]),
dialog(reflect(switch), [P,Q],
[ask(switch(P,Q), switch(P,Q)),
* some handling *,
resume(reflect(switch))]),
All these dialogues are very similar: they first "listen"
to their corresponding thread and after having handled
the information they resume. The corresponding threads
have to be modified as follows thus achieving synchroni-
sation:
dialog(do(P,A), [],
[execute(A),
tell(reflect(do), do(P,A)), ← sync.
 concurrent(react(P0))]),
dialog(switch(P,Q), [], 
[tell(reflect(switch), switch(P,Q)), ← sync.
concurrent(react(Q))]),
7 IMPLEMENTING THE COMPUTATIONAL 
CORRELATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS
We can now extend the machine to implement
context learning, by adding new concurrent threads.
Towards this end, we first handle the reflected
deliberation progress recording each plan switching with
the related condition. A reflected action starts the
compilation process. These dialogues are given hereafter:
dialog(reflect(switch), [P,Q],
[ask(switch(P,Q), switch(P,Q)),
call(switch(P,Q), C ⇒ switch(P,Q)),
execute(gw.store(switched(C,P,Q))),
resume(reflect(switch))]),
dialog(reflect(do), [P,A],
[ask(do(P,A), do(P,A)),
concurrent(trace(done(P,A))),
resume(reflect(do))]),
Reflect(switch) stores a switched/3 predicate
containing the condition C that triggered the plan
switching from P to Q in a dedicated object gw (standing
for global workspace). The condition is obtained through
a request communication act synchronizing the switch
dialogue with its reflect dialogue. The former has then to
be modified as follows:
 Figure 3: A representation of the virtual machine
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dialog(switch(P,Q), [Request], 
[tell(reflect(switch), switch(P,Q)),
return(reflect(switch,Request)), ←
concurrent(react(Q))])
Reflect(do) starts the compilation process initiated by
the dialogue trace. Applying reflection to our example
we may obtain the following predicates in the gw object: 
switched(true, initial,start),
switched(dirt(0,1), start, work),
switched((in(0,0) ∧ not dirt(0,0)), work, move(0,0))
Compilation consists in grouping all conditions
having led to select an action and generating a new plan
of type "context" ⇒ do(initial,a) where context is the
context formed with all conditions and generalizing their
arguments. These plans are similar to those used in
deliberation but they select directly an action once the
context is met. Compilation is implemented with the
following dialogues:
dialog(trace(done(P,A)), [Q], 
[execute(gw.retrieve(switched(_,Q,P))),
 enter(get_context(A,Q,P,[]))]),
dialog(get_context(A,P,Q,Trace), [C,O],
[execute(gw.retrieve(switched(C,P,Q))),
 ((not (P=initial) |
 [execute(gw.retrieve(switched(_,O,P))),
resume(get_context(A,O,P,[C|Trace]))]);
  (P=initial | 
 [execute(gw.generate(A,[C|Trace]),Ctx),
concurrent(teach(Ctx))]))]),
Applying it to our example, the following plans are
generated:
(in(X,Y) ∧ not dirt(_,_) ∧ not alarm)
⇒ do(initial, back(X,Y))
((in(X,Y) ∧ not dirt(X,Y)) ∧ dirt(_,_) ∧ not alarm)
⇒ do(initial, move(X,Y))
((in(X,Y) ∧ dirt(X,Y)) ∧ dirt(_,_) ∧ not alarm)
⇒ do(initial, suck(X,Y))
(in(X,Y) ∧ not dirt(_,_) ∧ not alarm)
⇒ do(initial, back(X,Y))
Again, these plans are very similar to the previous
plans. However an important distinction has to be pointed
out: they are only action selection plans as they comprise
no switch instructions. 
A new plan is set in the agent’s state through the
dialogue teach that run at the termination of get_context.
The dialogue teach simply transmits the plan to a learn
dialogue that inserts it in the agent’s local state. These
dialogues are defined as follows: 
reflexive(teach(P), [],
[tell(learn,P)]),
reflexive(learn, [P],
[ask(teach(P),P),
execute(store(P)),
resume(learn)])
Figure 5 provides a complete representation of the
virtual machine just presented. To sum up, consciousness
reflects deliberations and actions to new components that
generate new specialized contexts under the form of
plans and feed them back to the agent.
If all conditions of a new context are met, the action
is immediately selected and the agent does not have to
deliberate.
8 CONCLUSION
In order to evaluate how far our model implements
consciousness from a functional point of view we
confront it to the axioms proposed by Aleksander and
Dunmall defining minimal consciousness [1]. We recall
these axioms and confront each definition to our model: 
• (I) Depiction axiom requires that an agent "has
perceptual states" depicting part of the
environment. Our sense procedure interacting with
the environment provides perceptual states about
the environment in the agent’s local state
represented by unconscious processors. 
• (II) Imagination axiom says that an agent "must be
 Figure 5: A complete view of the virtual machine
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conscious of imagined as well as perceived
events". The processors depicting environment
may be conscious if they get involved in a
coalition. On the other hand our agent is not
imaginative at all as it runs predefined plans and
works only on this basis. However we could
consider that compiled contexts are "imagined
elements" but at this level they are not conscious as
they are precisely created to be unconscious. 
• (III) Attention axiom is verified when an agent "is
capable of selecting which parts of [the
environment] to depict [...]". The plan/action
selection function, i.e. the deliberation process
coordinating processors that depict environment
with processors activating actions within a
coalition, achieves this axiom. 
• (IV) Planning axiom implies that an agent "has
means of control over imaginational state
sequences to plan actions". Again our virtual
machine doesn’t implement imagination. However
if we consider that self generated contexts are an
imaginative process, the compilation process fits
this axiom as it generates new plans leading to
direct action selection.
• (V) Emotion axiom wants an agent to have
"additional affective states that evaluate planned
actions and determine the ensuing action".
Following this definition we do clearly not deal
with any emotion in our proposal. 
Concerning the emotion axiom, recall that Baars
considers that feelings like surprise - which can be seen
as an emotion - is caused by a context disruption forcing
the agent to use intensively its consciousness to form
again the disrupted contexts. Implementing this point of
view, i.e. extending the implementation of Baars’ model,
is the another issue of our future work.
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